An inverted Treasury yield curve-a yield curve where short-term Treasury interest rates are higher than long-term Treasury interest rates-is a good predictor of recessions. Because of this, economists and policymakers often assess the risk of a yield curve inversion when the yield curve is fl attening. I study the forecastability of yield curve inversions. Professional forecasters did not predict the beginning of the yield curve inversions prior to the 1990-1991, 2001, and 2008-2009 recessions. In all three cases, professional forecasters failed to predict the magnitude of the rise in shortterm interest rates. Prior to the 2008-2009 recession, forecasters also overpredicted long-term interest rates.
The Treasury yield curve, the curve showing interest rates on Treasury securities at different maturity horizons, contains important information about the US economy. In particular, an inverted yield curve, where interest rates on short-term Treasury securities are higher than interest rates on long-term Treasury securities, is a good predictor of recessions.
1 While there are reasons to believe that the relationship between the yield curve and recessions has changed, 2 Bauer and Mertens (2018) show that an inverted yield curve has preceded each of the previous nine recessions in the United States. Further, they show that an inverted yield curve has been consistently followed by an economic slowdown. 3 Given the recent fl attening of the Treasury yield curve, it is natural for economists and policymakers to be concerned about the potential for an upcoming inversion and a corresponding economic slowdown. Indeed, at the June 12-13, 2018, Federal Open Market Committee meeting, a number of participants thought monitoring the slope of the yield curve was important given that an inverted yield curve has historically indicated an increased risk of recession. However, in order to have the option of adjusting interest rates before the yield curve inverts, policymakers would need to be able to predict when an inversion is likely.
In this Commentary, I study whether professional forecasters predict yield curve inversions. To do this, I use the consensus or average forecasts of the interest rate on 10-year Treasury securities and the interest rate on 1-year Treasury securities from the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. These data cover 1988 to the present, and I fi nd that forecasters failed to forecast the beginning of the yield curve inversions that preceded the 1990-1991, 2001, and 2008-2009 recessions. Further, they forecasted yield curve inversions only once the yield curve inversion had occurred. 4 I fi nd that a common cause of the failure to predict yield curve inversions is a failure to predict the magnitude of the rise in the 1-year Treasury rates. However, these short-term rate forecast errors have shrunk with each inversion episode, a situation that is consistent with the Federal Reserve's increased transparency. In addition, professional forecasters overpredicted 10-year Treasury rates prior to the 2008-2009 recession.
ECONOMIC COMMENTARY
The Yield Curve and Recent Inversions Yield curves contain a collection of data points, each of which is an interest rate for a given Treasury maturity and any of which can vary over time. Figure 1 shows the Treasury yield curve for 2018:Q1 and 2017:Q1. Each data point is the quarterly average of daily constant maturity interest rates for a given maturity. 5 A comparison of the two yield curves shows that the yield curve has fl attened over the past year, driven by increases in short-term Treasury interest rates.
To simplify the analysis in this Commentary, I do not study the interest rate for every maturity displayed in fi gure 1. Rather, following Bullard (2017) and Bauer and Mertens (2018) , I study the term spread as measured by the difference between the 10-year Treasury rate and the 1-year Treasury rate. A negative value of this term spread indicates an inverted yield curve because the shorter 1-year Treasury interest rate is above the longer 10-year Treasury interest rate. Figure 2 shows this term spread from 1987 to 2018 along with recession periods, indicated by shaded bars. As with fi gure 1, the data are quarterly averages of daily constant maturity interest rates. This fi gure shows that yield curve inversions preceded each of the three previous recessions. Further, it shows that the yield curve has fl attened, albeit not smoothly, throughout the course of the current expansion as it has in previous expansions. 
The Professional Forecasts
The question I investigate is whether professional forecasters predicted the three yield curve inversions shown in fi gure 2. To answer this question, I use the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, which have forecasts for the 1-year and 10-year constant maturity Treasury interest rates going back to 1988. I use the consensus forecast for each maturity, the consensus forecast being the average of the individual Blue Chip forecasts. The forecasts are of average interest rates over a quarter, and these forecasts are produced monthly. To give the forecasters the most available information when making their forecasts, I use the forecasts produced in the last month of each quarter: March, June, September, and December. Figure 3 shows the Treasury term spread along with two forecasts. In both panels, the dark line is the actual term spread in a given quarter. In the left panel, the green line shows the predicted value of the quarter's term spread made two quarters prior. In the right panel, the green line shows the predicted value of the quarter's term spread made four quarters prior. Shaded bars in both panels indicate a yield curve inversion.
Because the predicted values of the term spreads, the green lines, are positive both during and after the 1989:Q1 to 1989:Q2 yield curve inversion, fi gure 3 indicates that professional forecasters failed to predict the 1989:Q1 to 1989:Q2 yield curve inversion at both a 2-quarter-ahead and 4-quarter-ahead horizons. These fi ndings show that professional forecasters have not forecasted a yield curve inversion unless an inversion has already taken place. This result is similar to how recessions are only identifi ed with lag. 7 It also shows that professional forecasters have not made any false alarms about a yield curve inversion.
What Do Professional Forecasters Get Wrong?
To see why professional forecasters missed the onset of all three yield curve inversions, I examined their forecasts of 1-year and 10-year Treasury interest rates separately. Figure  4 shows the 1-year and 10-year Treasury interest rates during each yield curve inversion episode along with the corresponding professional forecasts. Shaded bars indicate yield curve inversions. The left panels of fi gure 4 show the 1-year interest rates and forecasts. In all three yield curve inversions, professional forecasters failed to forecast the magnitude of the rise in 1-year Treasury rates. 8 Hence, an unpredictably rapid rise in the short end of the yield curve is a common cause in failing to predict yield curve inversions. 2. In the press conference following the December 12-13, 2017, Federal Open Market Committee meeting, former Chair Janet Yellen noted that a low term premium is one factor that could cause this change.
3. Wheelock and Wohar (2009) survey the academic literature and fi nd that the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates is also useful for forecasting recessions across many countries and with several different statistical models.
4. Documenting this failure to predict yield curve inversions is not intended to question the abilities of professional forecasters. Indeed, Diebold and Li's (2006) model, a standard yield curve forecasting model, also fails to predict the beginning of yield curve inversions and only forecasts inversions after an inversion has happened. See the online appendix for details: clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2018-economic-commentaries/ ec-201806-appendix.
